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Policy Changes to Improve 
Market Outcomes
Carolyn L. Weaver 
American Enterprise Institute
I appreciate having the opportunity to participate in this conference 
and discuss the very important issues surrounding the rapid growth of 
the social security disability programs. This conference really is a first, 
as far as I know, in terms of bringing a significant analytical effort to 
bear on this problem and trying to bridge the gap between the research 
and the public policy worlds. This effort is important and long overdue. 
I hope it turns out to be the first of other such efforts that might 
broaden the base of our knowledge about disability and about the ways 
the government can and cannot reasonably be expected to improve the 
lives of people with disabilities.
Having said this, I will begin with a conclusion: The research pre 
sented by David Stapleton and others confirms what we have known 
for a very long time—disability is not an all-or-none condition, the 
presence or absence of which can be readily discerned in some system 
atic and reliable way. Disability is a complex and changing phenome 
non; it exists on a continuum; and its presence (or absence) and 
severity are extremely difficult to quantify or assess with precision. 
There is not only a problem of assessing the medical severity of indi 
viduals' physical or mental impairments, but also a problem of assess 
ing the impact of these impairments on work ability or on labor market 
or other outcomes. Moreover, the severity of work disabilities for peo 
ple with any particular impairment can be affected mightily by the eco 
nomic incentives and constraints they face.
Superimposed on these problems are all of the problems attendant to 
decentralized, public decision making. Disability determinations are 
made by literally tens of thousands of people in various bureaucratic, 
political, and judicial roles—as well as medical and vocational roles— 
who are subject to constantly changing rules and regulations and bud-
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getary and political pressures. Findings of disability, in other words, 
can be affected mightily by incentives and constraints—in this case, 
the ones facing decision makers (Weaver 1986).
One implication of all of this is that the federal government's largest 
cash benefit programs for people with disabilities, Social Security Dis 
ability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) can 
grow—and shrink—rapidly and serve populations whose compositions 
change dramatically, for reasons that are quite independent of underly 
ing trends in public health or in federal legislation. While this may not 
be news to program administrators or to researchers, it is nevertheless 
cause for deep concern. The federal government makes a very large 
commitment of tax dollars to the social security disability programs— 
close to $70 billion this year ($100 billion including Medicare and 
Medicaid), nearly double the level just five years ago (U.S. Govern 
ment 1995; Committee on Ways and Means 1994; Board of Trustees 
1995). Ensuring that these dollars flow to the people the programs were 
intended to serve would seem to be the first test of their effectiveness. 
Social policies cannot be deemed effective) and certainly not cost- 
effective, simply because a lot of money has been thrown at a problem 
and some of it seems to have stuck in the right place.
This brings me to a question: Who are the social security disability 
programs intended to serve? It is easy enough to give a definitional 
answer—the programs are intended to serve people so severely 
impaired that they cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity 
anywhere in the national economy (it says so right in the law!). But in a 
world with modern technologies, therapies, and medical and vocational 
interventions and techniques, this defines a small segment of the work 
ing-age population with mental or physical impairments. Indeed, a fun 
damental tenet of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is that 
even people with severe disabilities can, if provided the right environ 
ment, work and make lives for themselves and their families. One need 
only consider the example of a person who is, say, blind or deaf—and 
thus categorically "disabled" under social security law regardless of 
educational or professional attainment—to appreciate the fact that the 
social security programs provide ongoing cash support to a broader 
population than implied by the general definition of disability.
The research findings presented at this conference bring into sharp 
focus the extent to which the disability programs are not what they
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once were and do not serve who they once did. Gone are the days when 
DI, for example, served people with physical disabilities who found 
themselves out of work (or quitting work) late in life. Increasingly, DI 
serves prime-age men and women with mental illnesses of some sort, 
most of whom never leave the benefit rolls. Despite dramatic improve 
ments in science and medicine, in technology and information, and in 
the educational opportunities of young people with disabilities, which 
have improved the quality of life of people with disabilities as well as 
the job opportunities open to them, the number of people on the dis 
ability rolls has never been higher (Weaver 1992; Koitz, Kollman, and 
Neisner 1994).
This has many important public policy implications, not the least of 
which is that the idea that DI is an "early retirement" program may die 
hard, but die it must. The beneficiary population is getting younger and 
the opportunities for rehabilitation, recovery, and return to work are 
getting better. Work is the key determinant of economic well-being in 
our society and a widely shared goal of working-aged Americans, dis 
abled and nondisabled alike. Pursuit of this goal is undermined by the 
government only at great fiscal and social cost.
In the spirit of some of the welfare reform proposals now under dis 
cussion, there may be merit to reorienting the social security disability 
programs toward transitional aid for people whose conditions are not 
permanently disabling. The presumption underlying federal policy 
should, in the main, be that people who are disabled can gain the skills 
necessary to work; people who become disabled will recover and go 
back to work. A practical change in current policy that might help 
bring about such a reorientation would be to place a time limit on ben 
efits. For example, benefits might be granted for a period of three 
years. Individuals could reapply for benefits, and, if found unable to 
work, be granted benefits for another fixed period, but the presumption 
would be that work would follow. (This is not inconsistent with the 
suggestion made by Stapleton, Coleman, and Dietrich [1995; and 
Chapter 2, this volume] regarding the payment of temporary benefits 
during economic recessions.)
More direct "work incentive" provisions, which have been added to 
the programs over the years, have been largely ineffective (Muller 
1992; Hennessey and Muller 1994). While the reasons, no doubt, are 
many and varied, two stand out: first, work incentives and other poli-
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cies designed to promote work have typically been superimposed on 
the back end of the disability process—after the individual has left the 
labor force or made the transition from school to unemployment and 
has begun drawing cash benefits; second, they have built a more and 
more complex system atop the central (contradictory) policy—the def 
inition of disability—which requires that the individual be unable to 
work. Individuals who, in order to work, overcome the severe impair 
ments that qualify them for benefits and take advantage of the work 
incentive provisions ultimately find themselves ineligible for cash ben 
efits and without the security of Medicare coverage.
Clearly, reforms intended to improve labor market outcomes for 
people with disabilities must focus on the front end of the disability 
process, keeping people at work or on the path to work so that—to the 
extent possible—they never enter the system in the first place, a system 
described by some disabled people themselves as a "trap." Research 
suggests, for example, that employees who become disabled have bet 
ter labor market outcomes, in terms of duration of employment, when 
their employers work with them from the onset of the disability, main 
taining the continuity of the employee-employer relationship through- 
out the period of hospitalization and rehabilitation, and 
accommodating the workers' changing abilities and circumstances at 
the workplace (Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim 1995). The employer is 
critical to work recovery efforts.
The same message is echoed by rehabilitation counselors. Early 
intervention—ideally before the individual has ever lost his or her 
job—is critical to success.
More generally, reforms must address the employer side of the work 
equation, which is now largely ignored by policymakers. Consider the 
reasonable accommodation requirement in the Americans with Dis 
abilities Act. This amounts to a mandated benefits program, the cost of 
which is imposed on employers. Or consider the DI tax. Employers 
who make accommodations and go the extra mile to hire or retain peo 
ple with disabilities—thus sparing the social security system of at least 
a portion of the potentially large cost of supporting these people for 
life—must pay the same tax as all other employers. Or consider 
increases in minimum wage laws and other mandated benefits pro 
grams. These policies increase the cost of hiring low-skilled workers, 
discouraging the employment of precisely the kind of people who
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dominate the SSI rolls, people with poor educations and few job skills. 
Enhancing the employment of these people—aptly described by 
Burkhauser (1992) as the "doubly disabled"—will clearly require more 
than work incentives and civil rights; it will require basic measures to 
enhance the skills these people bring to the labor market, to reduce the 
barriers to part-time or low-wage work, or to subsidize employer's 
adjustment costs (Weaver 1991).
In the longer term, serious consideration should be given to privatiz 
ing the supply of disability insurance—not for all risks faced by all 
workers, but for the routine risks faced by workers who are not yet dis 
abled. While private insurers do not, by any means, have the answers to 
all or even most of the problems besetting the social security disability 
programs, they do have the ability to respond quickly to changes in 
knowledge and to new circumstances and opportunities—and the 
incentives to do so are strong (Weaver 1986, 1992).
If private insurers were to cover the routine risks faced by the typical 
worker, the federal government could turn to the question of how best 
to target resources on, and to provide more adequately for, people with 
special needs: people born with severe congenital abnormalities, 
unemployed people who become disabled, people with terminal ill 
nesses, people with catastrophic health expenses. DI provides the same 
coverage for everyone and, as a result, cannot meet the needs of any 
particular group particularly well. Some of the substantial resources 
being devoted to providing income support to prime-age men and 
women with substantial work histories could then be redirected to 
other worthy causes—including meeting the needs of children and 
adults with disabilities that leave them little hope of one day competing 
in the job market, with or without civil rights protections.
To date, Congress has managed to side-step the issue of the very 
rapid growth of the DI program—and obscure a very large (50 percent) 
increase in the DI tax rate—by a so-called "tax reallocation" between 
the social security retirement and disability programs (Board of Trust 
ees 1995). Since both programs are in long-range deficit, this was a 
stop-gap measure at best and, in my view, not well advised. The social 
security disability programs cannot retain broad public support without 
effective control over the beneficiary rolls, and effective control is 
unlikely to be achieved until policymakers confront directly the finan 
cial, economic, and social causes and consequences of rapid growth.
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Perhaps the next fiscal crisis will focus the attention of policymakers 
and provide the impetus for considering revamping two programs that 
provide much needed support to some and one-way tickets out of the 
labor market for many others.
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